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[Of the many different variations that can occur in human sexual formation, trans-
sexualism no doubt remains the least understood by the wider Australian commu-
nity.  As a consequence, the process of attaining human rights to legal status, 
privacy, dignity and freedom from discrimination for those who experience this 
unusual condition has been a slow and sometimes frustrating one.  The article seeks 
to introduce the reader to some of the more recent developments in the interna-
tional jurisprudence of transsexualism and the underlying medical evidence that 
has supported them.  It also offers criticism of the belated attempt by the State of 
Victoria, with the Births, Deaths & Marriages Registration (Amendment) Act 2004, 
to establish certain statutory rights in this regard.  While the legislation was en-
acted with the stated and very laudable purpose of providing for the correction of 
birth records on the Register of Births of those people with transsexualism who 
have altered their phenotypic sex by hormonal medication and surgery, the article 
argues it has also served to remove other equally important rights already won and 
proposes that a final remedy will only be found, as on previous occasions, in the 
courts.]   
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This is the way the world ends 
 
This is the way the world ends 
 
This is the way the world ends 
 
Not with a bang but a whimper. 
 
- T S Elliot, The Hollow Men (1925) 
 
 
I INTRODUCTION 
 
Sometimes it must seem that people who experience transsexualism, having been 
trampled to the bottom of the heap by nearly all other factions since time immemo-
rial, are prepared to sit back like those “hollow men” and quietly accept their mea-
gre lot from society, rather than be counted when it matters most.  Nothing, 
however, is further from the truth, especially when it is a matter of human rights 
and discrimination against them that is enshrined in law. 
 
On 1 June 2004, the Governor of Victoria gave Royal Assent to the Births, Deaths 
& Marriages Registration (Amendment) Act 2004.1 It provided a mechanism ena-
bling Victorian citizens living with transsexualism to correct their Birth Certificate 
details to reflect their contemporaneous circumstances and be regarded as members 
of their affirmed sex for all purposes of the laws of Victoria.  It drew no public 
media comment.  The passage of the legislation through both Houses of the Parlia-
ment was similarly unremarkable – a reflection, perhaps, of the standard of debate 
and the fact it was 16 years in the coming.2  
 
The Explanatory Memorandum described the purpose of the Bill as amending the 
principal Act ‘to provide for the recognition of the sex of persons who have under-
gone sex affirmation surgery’.3 While the amended Act certainly achieves this, it 
fails as a comprehensive human rights document for three important reasons: it 
treats people with transsexualism differently to others diagnosed with variations in 
                                                        
1
 Act No 29 of 2004. 
2
 The Sex Reassignment Act 1988 (SA) came into operation on 15 November 1988. This was followed at 
various times by similar enactments in other States and the Territories, Victoria being the last to respond. 
3
 Births, Deaths & Marriages Registration (Amendment) Bill 2004, Explanatory Memorandum, Parlia-
mentary Document Library, Parliament of Victoria. 
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sexual formation; it fails to accord a compassionate outcome to those who cannot 
undergo major surgeries for valid medical reasons; and it requires the dissolution of 
any existing valid marriage the applicant is a party to.   
 
This article seeks to put some “bang” back into human rights processes within the 
federation of democratic States that is Australia. 
 
II TRANSSEXUALISM AS AN INTERSEX CONDITION  
 
Ever since Dr Magnus Hirschfeld first distinguished the transsexual condition from 
transvestism, there has been a tension within the medical and social science com-
munities as to its true aetiology.  The weight of argument is now very firmly on the 
side of those who conceive of it as a biological condition, rather than a psychologi-
cal one, so much so that a biological basis is now accepted as a fact proven to the 
civil standard under Australia’s common law.4 
 
Dr Hirschfeld was both an endocrinologist and a sexologist.  He rationalised that 
only a biological explanation could reveal the mystery of this strange phenomenon 
in which the individuals not only wished to live as members of the sex opposite to 
their phenotypic sex, they actually believed themselves to be of that opposite sex 
and were prepared to go to great lengths to be accepted as such.  He decided to 
classify the disorder in the newly created intersex nosology,5 first describing it as 
“psychic transsexualism” in 1923 in a paper titled, ‘Die intersexuelle Konstitution’.6 
Hirschfeld used this new term to distinguish neurological gynandromorphs (people 
with both male and female brain formation) from physiological hermaphrodites 
(people with both male and female reproductive characteristics), but without estab-
lishing a separate nosographical category.7 Significantly, he was involved in the 
early pioneering work using hormones and surgery to correct the bodies of trans-
sexual people once it became apparent that what was in their minds could not be 
changed.8 
                                                        
4
 Re Kevin (validity of marriage of transsexual) [2001] Fam CA 1074, [270]-[272].  
5
 Richard Goldschmidt, ‘Intersexuality and the Endocrine Aspects of Sex’ (1917) 1 Endocrinology 453-
456: Goldschmidt was a very important evolutionary theorist and the first modern user of “intersexual” 
as a nosographical terminology.    
6
 Magnus Hirschfeld, ‘Die intersexuelle Konstitution’ (1923) 23 Jahrbuch für sexuelle Zwischenstufen 3. 
Le premier usage du terme "transsexuel psychique" ("seelischer Transsexualismus"), qu'il distingue de la 
"corporéité gynandromorphe" des hermaphrodites physiologiques, mais sans individualiser une catégorie 
nosographique. [Author’s translation: Magnus Hirschfeld, ‘The Intersexual Constitution’ (1923) Year-
book for Sexual Intermediaries 3-27. The first usage of the term, “psychic transsexualism” (“seelischer 
Transsexualismus”), that which distinguishes the psychological gynandromorph from the physiological 
hermaphrodite, but without making an individual nosographical category…] 
7
 ‘Bibliographical work on the problems of sexual identity’ in Gallimard, The Impossible Metamorpho-
sis: Essay on Transsexualism and Personal Identity (2003).  
8
 See, for example: Magnus Hirschfeld, Sexualpathologie. Sexual Zwischenstufen Vol 2 (1922) which 
contains the first testimony on the history of surgical treatment of people with transsexualism, including 
the cases of “Rudolph”, who had a bilateral mastectomy and took the name of “Gilded” (Dorchen), and 
Felix Abraham who had a penectomy (Hirschfeld was one of the team who reoperated on him in 1930 to 
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In 1949, Cauldwell, a psychiatrist and sexologist, published a series of papers that 
was widely published amongst his peers.9 In them, he described transsexualism as a 
delusion and a sexual deviance.  His theory gained wide acceptance and set in place 
the double stigma of delusion and sexual deviance, underpinned by ignorant preju-
dice, that became the lot of those affected by the transsexual condition.  It spawned 
theories about excessively gay males and ultimate transvestites in a flush of sensa-
tionalist media reports surrounding the outing of former GI, Christine Jorgenson,10 
in 1953.  In doing so, the media ignored entirely the 50% of people with transsex-
ualism that was born with a female phenotype.  It is salient to this discussion that 
Christine, in her autobiography, defined herself as ‘…an individual belonging  
to the highest degree of intersexuality; male organs in a female body.’  
 
Despite the rise and rise of the psychologists, strong efforts were made to continue 
research into the somatic approach as the hormonal and surgical treatment of the 
condition became ever more common and successful.  Foremost in these efforts was 
Dr Harry Benjamin, another endocrinologist who had followed the earlier work of 
Hirschfeld with great interest.  Benjamin clearly distinguished between transvestism 
(psycho-somatic) and transsexualism (somato-psychic) and became more and more 
intrigued by the experiences of those affected by the latter.  As early as 1953, he 
advocated a biological explanation to the syndrome, believing that the genetic and 
endocrine systems must provide a "fertile soil" for environmental influences.11 He 
stated that: 
 
…[I]f the soma is healthy and normal no severe case of transsexual-
ism....is likely to develop in spite of all provocations.12  
In his Magnum opus, ‘The Transsexual Phenomenon’,13 which was published in 
1966, Benjamin defined transsexualism by the individual’s belief they are a mem-
ber of the sex opposite their phenotype and a concurrent overwhelming need for 
surgical reassignment.14  
 
Dr Benjamin strongly supported the view that transsexualism was a form of intersex 
condition saying:  
 
Intersexes exist, in body as well as in mind.  I have seen too many trans-
sexual patients to let their picture and their suffering be obscured by unin-
formed albeit honest opposition.15  …Biologically minded authors are 
likely to consider…TSism as one of the "intersexual" phenomena but 
                                                                                                                                 
construct a neo-vagina making Abraham the first recorded case of male transsexualism treated by 
surgery).  
9
 David Cauldwell, ‘Psychopathia Transsexualis’ (1949) 16 Sexology 274. 
10
 Christine Jorgensen, Emergence: A Transsexual Autobiography (1967).  
11
 Dave King, The Transvestite and the Transsexual: Public Categories and Private Identities (1993) 14.  
12 Harry Benjamin, ‘Transvestism and Transsexualism’ (1953) 5(2) Journal of Sex Research 13. 
13
 Harry Benjamin, The Transsexual Phenomenon (1966). 
14
 Ibid 2. 
15
 Ibid 51. 
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those are almost exclusively European scientists.  American writ-
ers…reserve the term "intersexuality" exclusively for visible signs of dis-
orders of sexual development, that is to say, for hermaphroditic and 
pseudo-hermaphroditic abnormalities.  The Europeans, especially the 
Germans, use the term in a much wider sense.16 17  
 
That “wider” sense, of course, is the true meaning of the term first given it by 
Hirschfeld all those years ago; the condition where both female and male character-
istics are present in an individual.18 
 
Gillies and Millard pioneered phalloplasty repairs for soldiers who had been dam-
aged in the genital region during World War II.  Subsequently applying their skills 
in the areas of intersex and transsexual surgeries, they wrote in 1957 that: 
 
The physical sex picture does not always bear a fixed relation to the be-
haviour pattern shown by an individual.  One or other hormone may de-
termine an individual's male or female proclivities quite independently of 
the absence of some of the appropriate physical organs.  It may be sug-
gested, therefore, that the definition of hermaphroditism should not be 
confined to those rare individuals with proved testes and ovaries but ex-
tended to include all those with indefinite sex attitudes.19 
In more recent years, a plethora of researchers have given credence to the remark-
able insight of these early researchers by providing both empirical and anecdotal 
proof of the biological intersex nature of transsexualism.  Their findings have since 
been used to inform the common law of Australia. 
 
Professor Louis Gooren, an endocrinologist and Chair of the only Faculty of Trans-
sexualism in the world, a part of the Free University of Amsterdam and its teaching 
hospital, presented the Closing Speech at the Council of Europe’s 23rd Colloquy on 
European Law in 1993.20 Explaining the complex process by which a developing 
foetus becomes either male or female.  Professor Gooren said:   
 
Except for the chromosomes, there is no distinguishable difference be-
tween a future boy and a girl in the first 6 weeks of development.  After 
                                                        
16
 Ibid. 
17
 For example, Helene Stourzh-Anderle, a Viennese physician, favoured a biological approach and 
regarded transsexualism as ‘anchored in an inborn constitution’ and therefore ‘an intersexual manifesta-
tion that could be combined with infantile (subsexual) features’: Sexuelle Konstitution (1955) Verlag f. 
Medizinische Wissenschaften, Wien-Bonn. 
18
 See, for example, Stedman's Medical Dictionary (Illus Version) (24th ed, 1984): 'intersex" - the 
condition of having both male and female characteristics; being indeterminate between the sexes; 
Macquarie Dictionary (2nd ed, 1992) 1858: ‘An individual displaying characteristics of both the male 
and female sex of the species.’ 
19
 H D Gillies and D R Millard, The Principles and Art of Plastic Surgery (1957)  370-1. 
20
 LJG Gooren, ‘Transsexualism, Medicine and the Law’ (1993) The Council of Europe’s 23rd Colloquy 
on European Law April 14-16, 1993 at <http://www.mermaids.freeuk.com/gooren01.html> 
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the first 6 weeks, the indifferent gonad becomes a testis in the case of a 
46, XY pattern, and an ovary in case of a 46, XX pattern.  All the follow-
ing steps in the differentiation process are dependent on the hormones 
produced by the testis before birth.  The next step in the differentiation 
process is that of the formation of the internal genitalia.  These are com-
pletely identical ducts in boys and girls.  In the presence of testicular hor-
mones produced by the boy foetus, one pair of ducts will become prostate 
and deferential duct, while the other pair goes into regression.  In a girl 
foetus, the development is the contrary: there are no testicular hormones, 
so one pair does not develop; the other pair becomes the uterus and ovi-
ducts.  A couple of weeks later, the external genitalia develop from a 
common principle.  In the presence of testosterone, as is normal in a boy, 
the external genitalia become a penis and a scrotum.  In girls there is no 
testosterone around, and the external genitalia develop into a vulva and 
vagina.21 
 
Professor Gooren then discussed some of the ways in which the sexual differentia-
tion process may not proceed according to expectations, resulting in (intersex) 
infants with atypical genitalia and/or karyotypes.  Turning to the predicament of 
transsexualism, he said: 
 
It has always been assumed that the sexual differentiation was completed 
with the formation of the external genitalia.  But it is NOT.  Since the be-
ginning of this century we have known that the brain, too, undergoes a 
sexual differentiation… It is likely from the available evidence that in 
transsexuals the pattern of sexual differentiation of the brain has not fol-
lowed the pattern typical of that sex: in other words, the nature of the 
chromosomes, the gonadal and genital development are in contradiction 
with the brain sex; at least with the sexual self-image of which we assume 
the substrate to be in the brain…  
For all these people who have had the misfortune to incur a sex error of 
the body in their development, solutions have to be found...  experience 
teaches that being intersex makes a person subject to social abuse; such a 
person becomes a freak.  The only option is a rehabilitation to one sex or 
the other.  Rehabilitation does not pretend to be a cure.  It is exactly what 
the word says: rehabilitation makes the best of a condition that cannot be 
corrected essentially and fundamentally…  
Sex reassignment of transsexuals is a medical intervention on a sliding 
scale.  It is not essentially different from procedures in other sex errors of 
the body.  The same interventions including genital surgery are done in 
other cases of sex errors of the body.  This brings me to the issue raised in 
some of the legal material I have been reading in this context: Can it really 
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 Ibid 5. 
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be done: Sex reassignment in transsexuals? In other words: is the femini-
sation of the body by hormones and the construction of a neo-vagina, a 
true authentic sex change or is it a construct, an artefact, a modification 
only of the body? My answer would be that it is as much a sex change as 
it is in other cases of intersex.  Many of the intersex cases will have con-
tradictions between the variables, the criteria of sex …  
There can be no psychomedical ground not to treat these people respect-
fully; we must provide them with reassignment treatment which meets 
their needs.  In the cases of intersex, and this is particularly true of trans-
sexualism, medical treatment does not bring resurrection from one's ashes; 
it is not a cure.  It is not a completely new start; it is a rehabilitation proc-
ess.  We must accept the given fact of sex errors of the body and continue 
from there.  We must create the conditions for successful rehabilitation to 
the male or female sex as much in cases of transsexualism as in other 
cases of intersex subject.22 
 
Professor Milton Diamond, Director of the John A Burns School of Medicine, 
University of Hawaii, has probably done more to research the intricacies of 
sexual formation and identity than any other single person.  In a recent paper, 
he explained the different fundamentals of transgender and transsexualism 
thus: 
Unlike the majority of transsexuals that "feel they were born that way" 
many of those identifying themselves as transgendered or gender-bending 
or gender-blending persons are attracted to the concept of a constructed 
gender and see themselves and their lives as evidence of it.  Eschewing 
any strict male-female dichotomy, transgendered persons instead reach for 
a wide range of admixtures of male and female restructured anatomies and 
manifest masculine and feminine life-styles.  For those most unique in 
their display, to reflect the socially bizarre nature of their expression, the 
term "gender fucking" is used by outspoken transgenderists themselves 
and others as well.  The term is not seen as pejorative but apt…  
Transsexuals, who I believe are intersexed, have the body and genitals of 
one sex and the brain of the other making reconciliation of their sexual 
and gender identities problematic.  They solve their problems of reconcil-
ing, their disparate sexual identity and gender identity, by saying, in es-
sence, "Don't change my mind; change my body." 23 
 
                                                        
22
 Ibid 15-18. 
23
 Milton Diamond, ‘Sex and Gender: Same or Different?’ (2000) 10(1) Feminism & Psychology 46.  
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The Family Court of Australia in Re Kevin24  heard detailed evidence from numer-
ous international and domestic medical experts on the transsexual condition.  His 
Honour Chisholm J came to the conclusion that the former narrow definition of 
“sex” established by Corbett v Corbett25 thirty years earlier requiring congruency of 
all three of genitals, gonads and chromosomes, was no longer valid.  Finding that 
the phenomenon of “brain sex” was a biological fact, he said: 
 
In my view, the expert evidence in this case affirms that brain develop-
ment is (at least) an important determinant of a person's sense of being a 
man or a woman26 
… I see no reason why I should not accept the proposition, on the balance 
of probabilities, for the purpose of this case27…  
In my view, the evidence about the experience of transsexuals, and the 
strength and persistence of their feelings, fits well with the view that 
"transsexuals have a sexual brain development contrary to their other sex 
characteristics such as the nature of their chromosomes, gonads, and geni-
talia".28  
I am satisfied that the evidence now is inconsistent with the distinction 
formerly drawn between biological factors, meaning genitals, chromo-
somes and gonads, and merely "psychological factors", and on this basis 
distinguishing between cases of intersex (incongruities among biological 
factors) and transsexualism (incongruities between biology and psychol-
ogy)29…  
In my view the evidence demonstrates (at least on the balance of prob-
abilities), that the characteristics of transsexuals are as much "biological" 
as those of people now thought of as inter-sex.  The difference is essen-
tially that we can readily observe or identify the genitals, chromosomes 
and gonads, but at present we are unable to detect or precisely identify the 
equally "biological" characteristics of the brain that are present in trans-
sexuals.30  
Chisholm J held that the factors to be considered in determining a person’s 
sex included, but were not limited to, the sex of the gonads, genitals, and 
chromosomes; any hormonal and surgical rehabilitative treatment the per-
son had undergone; the person’s perception of their sexual identity (a 
manifestation of brain sex); and the perception of others towards them.31 
                                                        
24
 Re Kevin [2001] FamCA 1074.    
25
 Corbett v Corbett (otherwise Ashley) [1971] 83. 
26
 Re Kevin [2001] FamCA 1074, [247]. 
27
 Ibid [248]. 
28
 Ibid [269]. 
29
 Ibid [270]. 
30
 Ibid [272]. 
31
 Ibid [329]. 
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Following a long line of precedents in Australia, he further held that, post-
operatively, a person treated for transsexualism is a member of their re-
assigned sex.32  
In his response to the debate on the Marriage Amendment Bill 2002 in the Federal 
Parliament, Senator Brian Greig33 referred to the text of Chisholm J’s judgment 
above, commenting that: 
 
…[T]he traditional understanding that transsexuals are biologically of one 
sex but psychologically of another, is mistaken.  In fact, as the judgment 
stated, the argument is that transsexuals are as much biologically intersex 
as… other intersex cases are…34   
 
The Full Court of the Family Court upheld the decision on appeal35 and, further, by 
means of what seemed to be, with the utmost respect to the Full Court, a rather 
circuitous discourse on the evidence and cases, affirmed the position in Australian 
law that transsexualism is, indeed, an intersex condition and established that people 
with transsexualism should not be treated differently to others with intersexed 
conditions.  During the appeal proceedings, the Chief Justice, referring to the deci-
sion in W v W,36 an intersex marriage case in the United Kingdom, pressed counsel 
for the Attorney-General as to what the Attorney-General’s position might be 
 
…if the Full Court were to accept the argument that brain sex was a bio-
logical characteristic, and upon this basis, …effectively convert [the ap-
peal] case into an intersex case, to which the principles adopted in [the W 
v W] decision, if correct, would apply…37 
 
The Full Court disapproved of the first instance decision of Bell J in C and D38 that 
incorrectly relied on Corbett to hold a person who was born with both male and 
female physical characteristics could not marry.39 40 Approving the reasoning in W v 
W instead, the Full Court said: 
 
                                                        
32
 Ibid. 
33
 Senator for Western Australia (Australian Democrats). 
34
 Parliament of Australia, Hansard, Senate, 19 August 2002, in Australian Democrat Speeches, Avail-
able on-line at: <http://www.democrats.org.au/speeches/?speech_id=966&display=1> 
35
 Attorney-General of the Commonwealth v Kevin and Jennifer and the Human Rights and Equal 
Opportunity Commission [2003] FamCA 94. 
36
 W v W [2001] 2 WLR 673 before Charles J in the Family Division of the High Court of Justice. It was 
held that the test devised in Corbett does not apply to people with physical intersex conditions and they 
can marry in their chosen sex. 
37
 Kevin and Jennifer [2003] FamCA 94, [180].  
38
 In the Marriage of C and D (falsely called C) (1970) FLC 90, 636. 
39
 Kevin and Jennifer [2003] FamCA 94, [225].  
40
 Mathews J, in R v Harris and McGuiness (1988) 17 NSWLR 158 (CCA) also noted that C and D had 
been strongly criticised in that His Honour had purportedly followed Corbett when that decision had no 
bearing on the case at all.  
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It seems to us that the important thing about this judgment is that it clearly 
recognises that intersex persons can, in effect, choose their sex and 
marry… The question immediately arises as to why this principle does not 
extend to transsexual people; particularly if, as Chisholm J found, brain 
sex is a relevant factor in determining the issue.  If it does not do so, this 
leaves transsexual people as the only group within the community that can 
never marry, except to a person who is a member of what they regard as 
the same sex as themselves.  This is, of course, the reality in the case of 
transsexual people who have had surgical gender re-assignment, who can 
no longer function as a member of the sex, the physical characteristics of 
which they formerly had…41 
 
…[I]f there is substance in the view that brain sex is one of the most significant 
determinants of gender, then the distinction between intersex and transsexual 
persons becomes meaningless, and the view of Charles J persuasive.  This is 
because an intersex person appears to be defined as someone with at least one 
sexual incongruity.  If brain sex can give rise to such an incongruity then, le-
gally, we think that there may be no difference between an intersex person and 
a transsexual person.42  
 
…[T]he evidence for the existence of ‘brain sex’ was much stronger and was 
uncontroverted before Chisholm J.  We therefore think that on the evidence be-
fore him, it was open for Chisholm J to accept, on the balance of probabilities, 
that transsexualism is biologically caused…43  
 
Once this is accepted, we think it difficult to distinguish this case from the in-
tersex cases such as W v W…44 
 
The Re Kevin decision was quoted extensively in the matter of Kantaras v Kanta-
ras,
45
 in Florida, where Judge Gerard O’Brien, handing down that decision at first 
instance, described it as ‘one of the most important cases on transsexualism to come 
on the scene of foreign jurisprudence’.46 The court in Kantaras heard evidence from 
Professor Julie Greenberg, amongst others, who explained in some detail the proc-
esses of sexual differentiation that lead to a person being either male or female and 
the various intersex conditions (including transsexualism) that can result when the 
                                                        
41
 Kevin and Jennifer [2003] FamCA 94, [231].  
42
 Ibid [235]. 
43
 Ibid [290], [326]. 
44
 Ibid [291]. 
45
 In Re: Michael J Kantaras v Linda Kantaras [2003] Case No. 98-5375CA.  
511998DR005375xxxxWS, 6th Circuit, Florida. 
46
 Ibid 673. 
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process travels ‘a path less followed’.47 Although Kantaras has since been appealed 
and reversed, a further appeal is now being prepared.   
 
The Spanish Court of Appeals, Social Services Division, adopted a very similar line 
of reasoning in the 2003 matter of Katia in Madrid.48 The appellant health authority 
was found liable for the principal costs of hormone treatment and surgery for a 
woman living with transsexualism in Madrid.  There was no evidence of any disor-
der of sexual differentiation other than the person’s innate sense of their femaleness 
and overwhelming desire for surgical rehabilitation of their phenotype.  The Ap-
peals Court, affirming the judgment below, considered public policy that provided 
such services to people with “intersex pathologies”, but purported to exclude those 
with transsexualism from its gambit, as discriminatory, and against the European 
Convention on Human Rights.  The Appeals Court, after considering medical evi-
dence as to the nature of transsexualism, held that the applicant ‘is profoundly 
affected with a pathological intersex condition and that the guidelines require that 
the sex reassignment surgery be paid by Social Security’.49 
 
Most recently, in the United States again, an Amicus Curiae brief provided to the 
US Supreme Court50 by the Harry Benjamin International Gender Dysphoria Asso-
ciation (comprising the majority of the world’s experts in the field of transsexual-
ism) stated: 
 
The present findings of somatostatin neuronal sex differences in the BSTc 
and its sex reversal in the transsexual brain clearly support the paradigm 
that in transsexuals sexual differentiation of the brain and genitals may go 
in opposite directions and point to a neurobiological basis of gender iden-
tity disorder. 
[T]ranssexualism is a disorder of sexual differentiation, the process of be-
coming man or woman as we conventionally understand it.  Like other 
people afflicted with errors in the process of sexual differentiation, inter-
sex conditions, transsexual people need to be medically rehabilitated so 
that they can live normalized lives as men or women. 
The only available, successful and appropriate treatment at present for se-
vere gender dysphoria is gender reassignment treatments, i.e.  psychiatric 
assessments followed by hormone treatment, the real life test and in suit-
able cases, sex reassignment surgery.  This has been confirmed by all long 
term studies.51 
 
                                                        
47
 See also Greenberg’s dissertation at the Symposium on Therapeutic Jurisprudence conducted by the 
Arizona Board of Regents, published as: Julia A Greenberg, ‘Defining male and female: Intersexuality 
and the Collision between Law and Biology’ (1999) 41 Arizona Law Review 265. 
48
 Madrid Institute of Health (IMSALUD) v Katia [2003] Appeals Court Case (SSD) No.30. 
49
 Ibid. 
50
 De’Lonta (Stokes) v Angelone et al (2004) C.A. #7:99-CV-00642. 
51
 Ibid 12. 
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Thus, transsexualism is now widely regarded as just another of the biological varia-
tions that occur in human sexual formation – an intersex condition.  It is about 
being a particular sex, not doing it.  It is also about recognising gender norms, not 
challenging them.  As the Full Court of the Family Court established in the Re 
Kevin appeal, “transsexual people” should have the same rights as others born with 
intersex conditions to be regarded for all legal purposes as the men and women they 
know themselves to be.  The Victorian Government, as a consequence of its deci-
sion to deny people with transsexualism access to the statutory discretion in s 43 of 
the Births, Deaths and Marriages Act 1996 (discussed below), and the stated spe-
cific purpose of the 2004 amendment, failed to grant us those same rights and 
clearly left open the aetiology question52 despite being presented with substantial 
evidence that acceptance of the biological basis leads to markedly better acceptance 
of people with transsexualism in the broader community, and a significant decrease 
in the incidence of acts of discrimination and violence against them.53 
 
III A VERY VICTORIAN INEQUITY 
 
Throughout Australia, legislation establishing procedures for birth registration 
makes provision for the correction of errors on the Register.  In Victoria, the rele-
vant provisions are found in s 43 of the Births, Deaths & Marriages Registration 
Act 1996 (Vic).  These allow the Registrar an administrative discretion to correct 
details in the Registrar inter alia to ‘bring an entry about a particular registrable 
event into conformity with the most reliable information available to the Registrar 
of the registrable event’.  One of the errors that the legislation is specifically in-
tended to address is that arising when an infant is born with an ambiguity in sexual 
formation and the attending physician or midwife makes a decision as to the as-
signment of legal sex which is later contra-indicated through subsequent medical 
investigation. 
 
The present Victorian Registrar, however, has exercised this discretion in a manner 
that has not been followed by any other jurisdiction in Australia.  In Victoria, reas-
signment of legal sex has occurred under the discretionary power even though the 
individual’s phenotypic sex had been previously medically assigned by hormonal 
treatment and surgeries for long periods, even decades, and no similar medical 
reassignment had preceded the correction.  This was a compassionate response in 
view of the fact that Victoria, unlike the other jurisdictions, had no provision to deal 
with transsexualism until the enactment of the 2004 amendment just a few short 
months ago; but no such justification exists now.   
 
                                                        
52
 In comparison, the UK Government issued a clear and unequivocal statement that transsexualism has a 
neurobiological basis and is not a mental disorder. Introduction to ‘Government Policy Concerning  
Transsexual People’, Available on-line at: <http://www.lcd.gov.uk/constitution/transsex/policy.htm> 
53
 See, for example, Mikael Landen and Sune Innala, ‘Attitudes Towards Transsexualism in a Swedish 
National Survey’ (2000) 29(4) Archives of Sexual Behavior 375. 
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In other jurisdictions, such as New South Wales, the Registrar’s discretion in this 
context is only used to correct a mistake in physical sex identification, not to pro-
vide redress for a medical wrong perpetrated 30 years beforehand.  A person who 
has had a legal and medical assignment of their sex during childhood who, much 
later, arrives at the decision that assignment was wrong for them is in precisely the 
same circumstances as anyone else experiencing transsexualism.54 They should 
have to avail themselves of the same procedures and meet the same requirements to 
correct their legal sex as does anyone else in similar circumstances – relevant cross-
hormone therapy and reasonable surgical interventions.  There are very clear inten-
tions expressed in other Australian jurisdictions that the specific provisions relating 
to transsexualism apply equally to all who similarly seek reassignment of their legal 
sex.  The South Australian Act, for example, provides that: 
 
…“reassignment procedure " means a medical or surgical procedure (or a 
combination of such procedures) to alter the genitals and other sexual 
characteristics of a person,  identified by birth certificate as male or fe-
male, so that the person will be identified as a person of the opposite sex 
and includes, in relation to a child, any such procedure (or combination of 
procedures) to correct or eliminate ambiguities in the child's sexual char-
acteristics.55  
 
The Registrar disagreed that this was, indeed, the case and, on the basis of the 
Registrar’s advice and the insistence of some intersex activists that transsexualism 
is not an intersex condition against all the evidence,56 the Victorian Government 
pursued a legislative path for “transsexual people” and endorsed the continued use 
of the administrative approach for “intersexed” applicants.  In so doing, the Victo-
rian Government failed to comprehend the importance of the Full Court of the 
Family Court’s enjoinder that people with transsexualism “should not be treated 
differently” and the considerable support received in that forum for the position that 
transsexualism has a biological basis and is hence to be regarded as another of the 
many different variations in human sexual formation – an intersex condition – 
rather than a deluded deviance.   
 
The Attorney-General told the Parliament, during the Second Reading Speech for 
the Bill to amend the Act, that: 
 
                                                        
54
 While no diagnostic tool for transsexualism exists, reliance continues to be placed on psychiatric 
analysis that differentially diagnoses transsexualism from contra-indicating conditions such as schizo-
phrenia and transvestism. The American Diagnostic and Statistical Manual adopts a general terminology, 
Gender Identity Disorder, which it subdivides between the “Specific” adult manifestation, code 302.60, 
and “Other”, code 302.85 which includes those with other intersex conditions including Androgen 
Insensitivity Syndrome (AIS) and Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH). 
55
 Sexual Reassignment Act 1988 (SA) s 3.  
56
 See, for example, the emotive and legally flawed comments on the website of the Androgen Insensitiv-
ity Support Group Australia <http://home.vicnet.net.au/~aissg/transgender_and_intersex.htm> and the 
discussion at <http://eminism.org/interchange/2004/20040429-intersexandrogyn.html> and compare 
 with <http://www.intersexualite.org/F-PositionsOfficielles.html> 
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I note that the process of application to the registrar set out in the bill is 
not intended to apply to people with intersex conditions as these matters 
are already dealt with under the act.  The act currently provides that where 
there has been a mistake at the time of entering details in the register, the 
Registrar of Births, Deaths, and Marriages may correct the register upon 
presentation of proof that such a mistake had been made.  This provision 
is currently used to correct the birth records of intersex people.  The bill 
will not alter this position.57 
 
It seems that the rhetoric of these same radical intersex activists blinded both the 
Registrar and the Attorney-General to the fact that the hormonal and surgical as-
signment of an infant is a quite deliberate act taken on the basis of the best medical 
evidence then available.58 That it turns out to have been an incorrect assignment 
when the individual is an adolescent, or even an adult, and articulates what their 
neurological development instructs them is their sex, places the individual in pre-
cisely the same circumstances as anyone else who was incorrectly assigned to a 
particular sex as a child on the basis of the best evidence.  It is a great tragedy that 
the paranoia of those intersex activists about being seen in the same medical basket 
as people with transsexualism was so intense that they failed to grasp the opportu-
nity to seek their community’s inclusion in the legislation and ensure it also con-
tained a statutory requirement that all surgeries on intersexed infants be delayed 
until at least such time as the individual is able to give informed consent to the 
standard laid down in Gillick59 and adopted in Marion’s Case.60 
 
In my view, it is clear the Registrar is ultra vires the Act in these circumstances and 
the exercise of the discretion is therefore a misapplication of the power.  If the 
position taken is held to be within the discretion provided by s 43, however, then 
the amending legislation itself has enshrined a further discrimination against the 
most vulnerable minority in the Victorian community61 on the basis of their actual 
or perceived “sex” and “impairment”.62  
 
 
                                                        
57
 Births, Deaths & Marriages (Amendment) Act, Hansard, Victorian Legislative Assembly 2004-04-22, 
789 
58
 This in no way justifies such procedures in infants in the absence of a true medical emergency and the 
author strongly supports the right of all people born with intersex conditions to exercise their rights to 
choose their sex and give their informed consent to any medical procedures necessary to support that 
choice.  
59
 Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority [1986] AC 112. 
60
 Secretary, Department of Health and Community Services v JWB & Anor (Marion’s case) (1992) 175 
CLR 218. 
61
 Victorian Gay & Lesbian Rights Lobby, ‘Enough is Enough: A Report on Discrimination and Abuse 
Experienced by Lesbians, Gay men, Bisexuals and Transgender People in Victoria’ (2000). 
62
 Equal Opportunity Act 1995 (Vic) s 6 provides that (b) “impairment” and (k) “sex” are attributes on 
the basis of which discrimination is prohibited in, inter alia, the provision of goods and services.  
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IV NO COMPARISON IN THE LAW FOR THE AGED,                 
INFIRM OR VERY YOUNG  
 
In the Torah (comprising the first five books of the Hebrew bible) it is written that: 
‘Justice, justice shall you pursue’.63 Many scholars have questioned why the com-
mand repeats the word “tzedek” or “justice”.  The Talmud proposes that ‘the first 
mention of justice refers to a decision based on strict law; the second, to a compro-
mise’.64 This is a two-fold understanding of justice recognising that sometimes, 
depending on the details of the context, the literal word of the commandment must 
be violated in order to preserve its spirit.  In a similar vein, ‘compassion fulfills the 
law of Christ’.65 Unfortunately, the spirit of compromise and compassion was 
largely conspicuous by its absence from the legislation amending the Births, Deaths 
and Marriages Registration Act 1996.  his is certainly the case for those few people 
who, despite having been diagnosed with transsexualism and evinced an over-
whelming desire to rehabilitate their phenotypic sex, are unable to do so because of 
contra-indicating medical conditions, especially those relating to the age of the 
applicant. 
 
The plight of some older men and women living with transsexualism comes readily 
to mind here. Having finally reconciled their own inner fears, misgivings and inter-
nalised prejudices sufficiently to commence the arduous journey of transition, they 
discover, to their abject dismay, that they have health issues which preclude them 
from undergoing the more radical surgical procedures involved.  Are they then to be 
left to die as they were born, legally assigned to the wrong sex? Similarly, what of 
the young diabetes sufferer or person with chronic nephritis who, simply by reason 
of their medical disability, is precluded from the benefit of this “human rights” 
initiative? 
 
What is perhaps even less rationally considered is the circumstance a young adoles-
cent with transsexualism is placed in by this omission.  He or she is denied the 
peace of mind, safety and privacy of an appropriately corrected birth certificate 
because, first, surgery for transsexualism is deemed medically inappropriate until 
age 18 years and, secondly, because Victoria specifically legislated to deny this 
right to minors. This was precisely the case in the matter of Re Alex66 where the 
former Chief Justice of the Family Court of Australia was highly critical of the 
failure of the states and territories to grasp the welfare ramifications for children 
and deal with them.67 His Honour said: 
 
…[A] young person such as Alex, on the evidence, would not be eligible 
for surgical intervention until at least the age of 18 years.   Thus, for the 
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 Deuteronomy 16:20. 
64
 Sanhedrin 32b. 
65
 The Holy Bible; Galatians 6:2. 
66
 Re Alex: Hormonal Treatment for Gender Identity Dysphoria [2004] FamCA 297. 
67
 This was particularly so in the case of the Victorian legislation which was still being considered in the 
Parliament and could easily have been amended to provide a lead for others to follow. 
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many purposes for which a birth certificate is required (such as an applica-
tion for a passport), a person such as Alex in those jurisdictions is required 
to produce a birth certificate that describes him as a female in circum-
stances where in all other respects he is living his life as a male...68 
Reflecting upon the particular circumstances of this case leaves me anx-
ious about the detrimental consequences that a young person such as Alex 
would suffer from having to present a birth certificate that is antithetical to 
his self-image…69 
 
While His Honour appeared to be directing his criticism particularly to the Victo-
rian proposals, it is a fact that legislation in most of the States in Australia excludes 
anyone under 18 years of age from correcting their details.  This occurs either 
directly, as in Victoria70 and New South Wales71 where it is a statutory requirement 
the applicant be an adult, or indirectly, as in Queensland72 where although provision 
is made for children, surgery remains an absolute prerequisite for reassignment.   
 
Prima facie, nothing appears to be possible to assist children under the existing 
provisions, but it is to be hoped for the sake of the others that medical professionals 
might heed the plea of the Victorian Parliamentary Secretary for Justice, Hon Jenny 
Mikakos, who said:  
 
What I have learnt during the course of being involved in the development 
of this bill is that sex affirmation surgery is a complex matter, and it can 
encompass a range of surgical procedures.  It will be the task of medical 
experts to determine when a person has had an adequate amount of sur-
gery for the purposes of the bill.  While the provision sets a legal standard, 
I am confident that the medical profession will use the scope available to 
assess individual patients...73  
 
and thus temper their own interpretation of the law with some of the compassion 
sorely missing from the statute. 
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 Re Alex [2004] FamCA 297, [234] 
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 Ibid [236]. 
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 Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1996 (Vic) s30A(1). 
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 Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1995 (NSW) s32B. 
72
 Births, Deaths and Marriages Act 2003 (Qld) s 23. 
73
 Second Reading Speech, Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration (Amendment) Bill 2004, Hansard 
Victorian Legislative Council, 25 May 2004, 1067. 
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V THE EXCLUSION OF MARRIED PERSONS FROM BIRTH 
CERTIFICATE REFORM AND THE FALLACIES UNDERLYING IT 
 
A The “bogey” of same-sex marriage  
Recently, it seems, everyone is obsessed by the possibility that same-sex marriages 
may be legitimised in Australia as, indeed, they have been in a number of jurisdic-
tions overseas.  The prospect, however remote, that an activist federal judiciary may 
redefine “marriage” in terms that would allow the inclusion of gay couples, galva-
nised conservative forces in religion to demand, and in politics to provide, a legis-
lated response guaranteeing the sanctity of this last bastion of heterosexism.  There 
is no doubt that both sides in the current debate saw the decision in Re Kevin as the 
bridge by which the walls of the marriage institution might be breached. 
 
Then Attorney-General, Daryl Williams, himself a Catholic and a staunch conserva-
tive, was certainly concerned that validation of the marriage between “Kevin” and 
“Jennifer” would give effect to a marriage between two women or, at the very least, 
would be seen to do so.74 During 1998, while the couple were making inquiries 
about their plans to marry, they received an email75 from an officer in Williams’ 
Department stating: 
 
No matter what your partner’s birth certificate will state, nor what surgery 
he/she has gender reassignment surgery does not change a person’s bio-
logical sex, your partner remains of the female sex… 
There would be enormous opposition to such a change from churches, etc.  
New South Wales faced enormous opposition to the changes it made in re-
lation to the changed birth certificates, a change to the Marriage Act 
would raise even more controversy… 
I am sorry we are unable to help you, but I am concerned that if you at-
tempt to go ahead with the course of action you suggest you are leaving 
your partner open to criminal charges and the possibility of jail and I hope 
you will take this into consideration when making your decision...76 
 
It was at this point that Kevin and Jennifer realised they would most definitely need 
a lawyer.  Rachael Wallbank, herself a woman of transsexual background, agreed to 
take the matter on a pro bono basis and the rest is history. 
 
                                                        
74
 It should be noted that AG Williams did make an amount of funding available which gave the Court 
‘the advantage of some very detailed and scholarly presentations from both sides as well as evidence 
from some of the most distinguished medical experts in the world in this field’ Re Kevin [2001] FamCA 
1074, [3]. 
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 Email addressed to “Jennifer”, dated 2 October 1998. 
76
 Ibid. 
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According to the Australian Family Association, itself a front for the extreme right 
Catholic Lobby, the National Civic Council, the fundamental meaning of marriage 
is under attack.  Taking a quantum leap over the existing boundaries of judicial 
reasoning, it suggests one way the gay lobby might achieve legal same-sex marriage  
 
…would be to seek to expand the new common law test decided by the 
Full Bench of the Family Court in Attorney-General (Cth) v Kevin and 
Jennifer as to whether a person is a man or a woman.  This decision al-
ready incorporates psychological factors which may be given more weight 
than biological realities.  The test set by the Court is so loose that it may 
be capable of being expanded to cover same sex marriages even where 
neither party is a transsexual.  For example, it may be sufficient for one of 
a male homosexual couple to define himself as taking the part of the 'wife' 
or 'woman' in the relationship for a Court to recognise him as a 'woman' 
for the purpose of marriage.77 
 
The Australian Family Association consequently still seeks the inclusion of biologi-
cal definitions of “man” and “woman” in the Marriage Act 1961 (Cth).  The collat-
eral effect of this would be, as occurred under the rule in Corbett, the exclusion of 
all people with intersex conditions, including those with transsexualism, from the 
right to enter into a legal marriage. 
 
Endeavour Forum’s Babette Francis, an anti-feminist and another member of the 
extreme Catholic right, in an alarmingly candid statement of divine belief, recently 
wrote to me that: 
 
I agree with you that gender assignment during infancy should not involve 
surgical mutilation, but I think gender assignment should be in conformity 
with chromosomes.   While there may be many cases of gonad and genital 
anomalies, the chromosomes indicate what the brain sex is - or should be - 
and this is the sex the infant should be assigned to. 
I know there are some chromosomal abnormalities but the presence of a Y 
chromosome indicates male, and its absence indicates female.  Surgical 
and hormonal treatments can follow when appropriate to match the chro-
mosomal sex. 
While I agree that most of those with "intersex" conditions may not 
be homosexual, the Kevin decision can be used by lobbyists for same-sex 
marriage.  I do also dispute that there are actually "intersex" conditions.  
There are genital and gonadal abnormalities, but chromosomes  indicate 
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the sex.   Genital and gonadal anomalies can be treated, chromosomes 
cannot be altered.78  
 
In subsequent communications, I put it to Mrs Francis that, according to her posi-
tion, a woman born with sex reversal syndrome, having naturally-formed female 
genitals and gonads, but XY chromosomes, would always be male.  She agreed.  I 
then asked her how she would determine the sex of someone with chimerism or 
mosaicism who is also an hermaphrodite.79 She procrastinated and attacked trans-
sexualism on the basis there is no sexual incongruity (despite the overwhelming 
medical evidence to the contrary).  Mrs Francis was also unable to answer the fact 
that an XXY woman (a man according to her view point) gave birth to a child.80  
The fundamentalist Protestant churches hold very similar exclusionary views as to 
what determines sexual identity and likewise confuse it with sexual orientation.81 
 
Distrust of judicial activism was also evident in the rush by Prime Minister Howard 
to “protect” the marriage institution from “contamination” and, in the process, 
manufacture another political wedge with which to keep the Opposition from 
power.  His response, the Marriage Legislation Amendment Act 2004 (Cth), was 
strongly supported in the Parliament by conservative elements within both Gov-
ernment and Opposition and passed easily through both Houses.  The position of 
religionists within the US Senate is equally clear.  According to the Republican 
Policy Committee:  
 
The pace of the gay marriage activists' campaign through the nation's 
courts is uncertain, but it is not at all certain that… legislation will stop 
determined activists and their judicial allies from pursuing this agenda- 
only a constitutional amendment will do that.82  
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The Australian media did little to help from the outset and, for example, following 
the first instance decision in Re Kevin, we witnessed headlines in The Australian 
screaming “same-sex” in its description of the now validated marriage between 
Kevin and Jennifer.  The Australian Press Council dismissed complaints that the 
material was ‘factually wrong, maliciously misleading, intentionally sensationalist, 
offensive to the concerned couple, and distressing to other transsexuals’ and con-
sidered it ‘a brief, but balanced summary of the essential facts’.  In its response to 
the complaints, The Australian pointed out that the "same-sex" view of the marriage 
was central to the Attorney-General's appeal.83 The author was the complainant in 
that matter and pointed out that it was central to the Court’s decision that it was 
decidedly not a same-sex marriage.  Even the radical left-wing competition, The 
Green Left Weekly, more usually noted for its incisive analysis of such issues, 
published the view that: 
  
In challenging the notion that gender is anything other than predetermined 
from birth, transgender people challenge notions of fixed and unchanging 
gender and sexuality.   
It's not a huge step to move from a transgender relationship being recog-
nised in the eyes of the law to gay and lesbian relationships being given 
equal moral legitimacy.  And that's something Darryl Williams and other 
social conservatives will work very hard to stop.84  
 
The reality is, of course, that people living with transsexualism (unlike transgenders 
with whom they are often incorrectly categorised) actually reinforce the binary 
notion of gender.  For people with transsexualism, homosexuality is the exception, 
rather than the rule, just as occurs in the rest of society, and the ultimate determina-
tion of sexual identity rests on far more complicated factors than chromosomes 
alone.  But that fear of being seen to allow same-sex marriages and the electoral 
backlash flowing from it has led to some extraordinary assumptions and decisions 
impacting adversely on the understanding of transsexualism and the rights of those 
affected by it, especially those who have remained in a prior valid marriage follow-
ing medically-induced changes to their phenotypic sex. 
 
 
B Legally confused or politically moribund? 
Section 5 of the Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration (Amendment) Act 2004 
inserts a new Part 4A into the principal Act.  Pursuant to this Part, s 30A(1) of the 
Act provides, inter alia, that an applicant seeking alteration of the record of their 
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birth registration must be unmarried.  In its response to the Attorney-General’s 
Discussion Paper preceding the proposed legislation,85 the Equal Opportunity 
Commission Victoria submitted, inter alia, that:  
 
Discrimination against a person on the basis of their marital status is pro-
hibited under both the Victorian Equal Opportunity Act and the Sex Dis-
crimination Act 1984 (Cth).  It is the Commission's view that precluding 
people who are married from accessing the proposed scheme would be 
contrary to the objectives of the Equal Opportunity Act.   
The Commission further suggests that there are no clear legal reasons to 
prevent married persons of transsexual background from accessing the 
benefits of the proposed scheme.  The 2003 Family Court case of the At-
torney-General for the Commonwealth and "Kevin and Jennifer" and Hu-
man Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (Intervener) has clarified 
that for the purpose of the validity of a marriage under Australian law, the 
issue of whether a person is a man or a woman is to be determined as of 
the date of the marriage.  Therefore, the sex of the parties at any time after 
the date of the marriage is not relevant to the validity of the marriage.  The 
implication of the decision in Re Kevin and Jennifer is that where one 
party to a marriage subsequently undergoes a process of sex affirmation, 
with the result that that party's affirmed sex is the same as their spouse's 
sex, the validity of the marriage will not be affected.    
The Commission strongly suggests that the State legislature should not in-
troduce provisions into the proposed scheme that prevent people of trans-
sexual background who are married from being able to have their affirmed 
sex recorded on their birth certificates.   The introduction of such dis-
criminatory provisions would limit the effectiveness of the proposed re-
forms and cannot be justified, particularly in light of the legal position 
articulated above. 
 
In his Second Reading Speech on the Bill for the Amendment on 11 May 2004, the 
Attorney-General, Hon Rob Hulls MP, made it very clear that the Government 
justified this patently discriminatory provision in the legislation on the basis of (i) 
consistency;86 and (ii) its fear of being seen to facilitate a same-sex marriage.  
During the debate,87 Mr Hulls said:  
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I want to say a couple of things in relation to the unmarried aspect of the 
legislation.  The first is that it is true this bill requires that a person be un-
married.  This is consistent with the model in other states and territories…  
The requirement for an applicant to be unmarried avoids the question of 
whether the person is in a same-sex marriage.  An example would be if a 
person was born anatomically female, married a man and then later transi-
tioned to being male - if that person were to remain married, the result 
would be prima facie a same-sex marriage.  Given that marriage is a mat-
ter for the commonwealth government - which, I might say, has made its 
views on same-sex marriages very clear… 
 
In relation to the likely illegality of the provision, vis-à-vis section 6 of the Sex 
Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) (‘the SDA’) mooted by the Equal Opportunity 
Commission, the Attorney-General further stated: 
 
…[W]e have advice that [inconsistency with the SDA] will not have rami-
fications in relation to that legislation.   
If this legislation in Victoria did allow a person to be married before tran-
sitioning and changing their birth certificate it may be open to a legal chal-
lenge on the basis of inconsistency with the commonwealth Marriage Act.  
While here in Victoria we are committed as a government to ensuring that 
people in domestic partnerships are treated in the same way as married 
people, the inability of a married person to apply for a changed birth cer-
tificate under this legislation is based on commonwealth law, over which 
we in Victoria have no control.   
 
With respect to the Attorney-General and those advising him, it is my view that 
enshrining such deliberate discrimination in legislation was nothing more nor less 
than a deliberate abrogation of the human rights of some members of a class of 
people for political, rather than any legal or medical science considerations.  The 
Government decided to favour consistency with similar legislation existing in the 
other States and Territories, rather than consistency with the common law position 
enunciated in Re Kevin where the relevant ratio was distilled in the statement that 
‘the sex of a person for the purposes of marriage is their sex at the time of the 
marriage’.88 As was pointed out in a number of submissions to the Victorian Attor-
ney-General, Chisholm J specifically considered the situation where a person who 
is already married completes sex affirmation treatment:   
 
What would be the position if the marriage law were to recognise the re-
assignment? The marriage would I think still be valid: its validity would 
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be determined as at the date of the marriage, and I would not think it 
would become invalid by reason of the reassignment…89 
The fact is that the assignment of transsexuals to one category or the other 
will inevitably mean that some of the person's characteristics will be those 
of the "other" sex.  The law's task, in this area through the definition it 
gives to the everyday words "man" and "woman", is to reach a conclusion 
that is just, compassionate and sensible.90  
 
Thus the Government has created a legal oxymoron where the sex of a person 
whose male phenotype has been rehabilitated to female by sex affirmation treatment 
is now regarded as a female under the marriage law, social security law, criminal 
law and administrative law, but is stuck with a male birth certificate that would, in 
effect, facilitate them marrying another female, a person of the same sex.  Compas-
sion and sense flew out the window when this became the law in Victoria. 
 
C The ultimate discrimination and a legal remedy 
It seems not unreasonable to propose that denying both the existence of contempo-
raneous facts that determine the sex of a person and the person’s consequent right to 
be recognised as a member of that sex under the laws of Victoria for all purposes, 
on the basis of the person’s marital status, is the ultimate discrimination that anyone 
living with transsexualism has been subjected to in Victoria since the Full Court of 
the Supreme Court in R v Cogley91 first heralded our steady departure from the 
narrow essentialism of Corbett.  It places those married individuals, and their 
spouses and children, in the invidious position of having to choose between their 
rights to marriage and family, and the right of the person with transsexualism to 
finally achieve legal status as the person they know themselves to be.  In my view, 
this is not only morally wrong, but the offending provision is clearly ultra vires the 
SDA. 
 
Section 6 of the SDA provides that: 
 
(1) For the purposes of this Act, a person (in this subsection referred to as 
the discriminator) discriminates against another person (in this subsection 
referred to as the aggrieved person) on the ground of the marital status of 
the aggrieved person if, by reason of:  
(a) the marital status of the aggrieved person; or  
(b) a characteristic that appertains generally to persons of the 
marital status of the aggrieved person; or  
(c) a characteristic that is generally imputed to persons of the 
marital status of the aggrieved person;  
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the discriminator treats the aggrieved person less favourably than, 
in circumstances that are the same or are not materially different, 
the discriminator treats or would treat a person of a different 
marital status.   
(2) For the purposes of this Act, a person (the discriminator) discriminates 
against another person (the aggrieved person) on the ground of the marital 
status of the aggrieved person if the discriminator imposes, or proposes to 
impose, a condition, requirement or practice that has, or is likely to have, 
the effect of disadvantaging persons of the same marital status as the ag-
grieved person.   
 
The section encompasses discrimination occurring in the supply of goods and 
services by virtue of s 2, and the provision of birth registrations and certificates by 
government fall within its ambit.92  
 
Under s 109 of the Australian Constitution, a law of a State or Territory which is 
inconsistent with a valid law of the Commonwealth, is invalid to the extent of the 
inconsistency.  The Sex Discrimination Act 1984 was enacted by the Common-
wealth under the external affairs power granted it by s 51(xxix) of the Australian 
Constitution and is a valid law of the Commonwealth.93 The object of the Act is to 
give effect to certain provisions of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Discrimination Against Women94 and to eliminate, so far as is possible, 
discrimination against persons on the ground of…marital status.95 The provisions of 
s 30A of the Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act are therefore not only 
inconsistent with the SDA, but invalid in so far as they purport to deny a corrected 
Birth Certificate to an applicant who is married.   
 
Finally, the Attorney-General’s concerns of inconsistencies between the Victorian 
Act and the Marriage Act can be dismissed on the basis that the applicant’s sex was 
correctly identified at the time of the marriage.  An altered birth certificate subse-
quent to a prior valid marriage cannot affect the validity of the marriage and there-
fore the marriage can only be dissolved by divorce or the death of one of the parties.    
 
 
VI CONCLUSION 
 
The Victorian provisions to permit the correction of birth certificates following sex 
affirmation surgery are arguably the most forward-looking amongst the States and 
Territories.  They are expeditious, clear and unambiguous.  They avoid difficulties 
with definitions and provide the certainty in law that flows from the surgery re-
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quirement.  Unfortunately, although the Victorian State Government, unlike the 
other States and Territories, had the advantage of being informed by the develop-
ments in the common law established by Chisholm J in Re Kevin at first instance 
and subsequently affirmed by the Full Court of the Family Court on appeal, the 
reforms they introduced do not reflect a concomitant level of wisdom and compas-
sion.   
 
For a particularly vulnerable few, those who are young or infirm and those who 
place the rights of spouse and children above their own, the new provisions actually 
enshrine the very discrimination they purport to remove by imposing untenable 
conditions based only in pragmatism and without medical or legal justification.  
This gives the knife of discrimination an especially vicious twist before it is with-
drawn. 
 
It seems inevitable that those aspects where the Government has opted for pragma-
tism instead of justice must now be tested in the courts.   
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
